This study examines how client business strategies moderate the relationship between specialist industry auditors and audit quality. The results show that auditor specialization negatively affects the audit quality, and client's business strategy negatively affects (weakens) the negative relationship between auditor specialization with auditor quality. These test results support the hypothesis of reduced knowledge gap.
Introduction
Several studies have documented that industry-specific audit can provide higher quality audit services (see [26, 30, 36] ). However, there is little evidence that show how client characteristics moderate the effects of industry specialization on audit quality.
Previous research has found that business strategy is an important determinant of audit quality. For example, a survey conducted by Dichev et al. (2013) of 169 CFOs of public companies and in-depth interviews to 12 CFOs, found that business strategy (business model) is the most affecting factor of earnings quality. The better the profit quality, the better the audit quality. Hence it can be said Dichev et al. (2013) suggests that business strategy is the most influencing factor on audit quality. Bentley et al. (2013) using the typology of business strategy Miles et al. (1978) , found that the type of prospector business strategy more frequently involved in the financial reporting irregularities, so that generally require greater audit effort. Several other studies have also proposed that strategic risk is an important component in the business risk audit model [9] and the main purpose of analytical procedures performed by the auditor is to understand the client's business [15] . The linkage between this strategy and audit, resulting in international and Indonesia audit standards requires the However deviant strategy can also be said to be a positive influence, if deviant strategy that was implemented by clients improve industry specialist auditors advantage compared to non-specialists. This is because, the auditor's specialty has audited numerous clients from the same industry, so when faced with clients with extreme strategies, specialist auditors will be more aware of the extreme strategies that clients implement than non-specialist auditors. Solomon, et al. (1999) also found that auditor specializations may better assess business or risk-related strategies than nonspecialist auditors. Low (2004) found that auditor specializations would be better at understanding the risk of high-risk audit contracts than non-specialist auditors.
And when a client has an extreme strategy, specialist auditors will be easy to find or use industry benchmark (industry benchmark) in assessing the appropriateness of accounting policies and procedures applied to the client. From these reasons, the deviant strategy that was applied to the client will relatively increase the advantage or knowledge gaps auditor specialization compared to a non-specialist (to support the hypothesis enlarge the knowledge gap -the enlarged knowledge gap hypothesis). Chi and Chin (2011) proposed that the influence of the industrial auditor's expert was primarily due to the level of partners not the industry specialization at the level of the public accounting firm. Regulation of the Minister of Finance No. 17 of 2008, Article 36, has required all public accounting firms to submit reports on business activities. In the report of business activities can be known the number and type of client industry handled each partner. Therefore, in this study, the constructs of auditor specializations are viewed from the audit firm level and partner level. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the ability to detect and report material mismanagement of financial statements, which depends on the independence of the auditor. The higher the quality of audit then reflects the higher ability of auditors in detecting the existence of earnings management action. This indicates that the audit quality will decrease the company's tendency in earnings management. Earnings management activities can be measured using discretionary accruals. Because of the level of earnings management reflects the quality of the audit, thereafter audit quality in this study will be measured using discretionary accruals. Measuring the quality of audits using discretionary accruals have been carried out by other researchers [3, 5, 6, 18, 20, 38] .
Research conducted by Yuan, Cheng, and Ye (2016) found that specialization auditor at partner level was significantly negatively associated with upward earnings management conducted by client (earnings management is proxied by discretionary accruals). DOI 10 .18502/kss.v3i11.2757
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The 2nd ICVHE And specialist industry influence is greater when the client's business strategy deviates from the normal strategy of the industry, this is consistent with the enlarged knowledge gap hypothesis.
As far as the author's knowledge, research related to auditor specialization has been widely performed in Indonesia [1, 14, 17, 27, 28] . And the auditor specialization relationship with audit quality (as measured by discretionary accruals) has been investigated by Setiawan and Fitriany (2011), Novianti, Sutrisno and Irianto (2012), and Wahyuni and Fitriany (2012). However, no one has examined the role of client strategy moderation toward the relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality.
This study examines the role of moderation of client's business strategy toward the influence of auditor specialization on audit quality in Indonesia with reference to research conducted by Yuan, Cheng, and Ye (2016), and then adds strategy typology Miles et al. (1978) in the process of testing and analysis. So, this study has three main contributions. First, this study provides evidence of the role of client strategy moderation to the auditor's specialist relationship with audit quality, and this will certainly enrich the literature in accounting management research as well as audit quality research in Indonesia. Second, this study analyzes the role of client strategy moderation seen from the typology of Miles et al. (1978) , which is the type of defender and prospector. And thirdly, in measuring the specialization of this research auditor uses data from the Center for Professional Finance Development, Secretariat General -Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. Hence, the number of clients for each public accounting firm and partner reflects the true state of affairs, not just public companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the agency relationship (agency relationship)
Hypothesis Development

Agency theory
is a contract in which one or more persons (the principal) conduct the engagement/contract with another person (the agent) that the agent will act in the interests of the principal by giving authority to the agent in decision-making. If each party wants to maximize its own utility, then it is possible the agent will act to maximize his utility, not the best utility for the principal. To limit the possibility of the occurrence of this deviation, the principals create an incentive for agents and also incurred costs for surveillance (monitoring) to limit the actions of the agent. 
Audit quality
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the ability to detect and report material misrepresentation of financial statements. The auditor's ability to find this error depends on the auditor's technological capabilities, the procedures applied in the audit process, the number of samples taken, etc. While the conditions under which the auditor will report an error, are a measure of the auditor's independence of the client being audited.
Implementing the audit engagement and the likelihood of the auditor expressing the error is difficult for external observers to observe. Therefore, an indicator is needed that reflects the quality of the audit. The proxy used to measure audit quality varies.
DeAngelo (1981) proposed size of the auditors (auditor size) as a measure of audit quality. While Carey and Simnet (2006) proposed the possibility of the auditor stated in the company going concern issues that threatened bankruptcy, the number of abnormal working capital accruals, missing earnings as a measure of audit quality benchmarks.
Measuring the quality of audit the most used is discretionary accruals [3, 6, 13, 30, 38] .
Discretionary accruals can be a measurement of the quality of audits, because the higher the auditor's ability to find deviations (auditor competence of high-quality high audit) the lower the tendency of clients to conduct discretionary accruals. The lower value of discretionary accruals showed good quality of earnings.
Auditor specialization
Specialization has an important role in improving effectiveness and efficiency. Industrial specialization refers to the accumulation of specific knowledge gained from serving many clients in the same industry [13] . Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999) define the auditor's specialty as the person assigned to his company and obtain training and experience of audit practices in a particular industry. Industrial specialization auditors also tend to invest more in staff training and technology related areas of their specialty, such investments will improve the quality of the resulting audit [35] . 
Auditor specialization and audit quality
Previous research has examined a great deal about the relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality. Solomon et al. (1999) conducted an experiment to find out the knowledge of the specialist auditors of health and financial industry clients. Knowledge is the knowledge of error information and non-error in the financial statements. Solomon et al. (1999) indicates that specialist auditors have more accurate knowledge of non-error information than errors in financial statements. Low (2004) found that the knowledge that auditor specialization has on the client industry can improve the ability of risk assessment and directly influence the quality of decisions in audit planning.
Audit quality performed by auditor specializations is also better than non-specialist auditors because they are capable of detecting errors and irregularities, and this difference is more noticeable in the early years of engagement [13] . Chi and Chin (2011) find that auditor specialization affects audit quality, and the influence of individuallevel specialist auditors within the same Firm, is variable. Recently, research that uses surveys and interviews conducted by Sarwoko and Agoes (2014) to 163 public accountants in Indonesia, found that specialization auditors have a significant impact on the implementation of audit procedures used to detect fraud, and it can improve the quality of audits. Therefore, we propose the hypothesis in the alternative format as follows:
H1: specialization auditor positive effect on audit quality. Simons (2000) defines business strategy as a way that companies use to compete in a particular product market. According to neo-institutional theory, companies following normal industry strategy will gain legitimacy, gain access to external sources, reduce performance uncertainty, and improve survival [22, 33] . However, if the manager ambitious or too confident, it is possible for company to not the same as the trend of the industry in general, and adopted deviant strategy to achieve the desired performance, that is, getting a big win [34] . This gives rise to the diversity of the company's business strategy in the same industry (intra-industry). The 2nd ICVHE order to gain more benefits than competitors in the industry. When clients implement strategies that deviate, then the client is said to apply deviant strategy.
Business strategy
Specialization auditors, audit quality and client business strategy
In theory, the influence of deviant strategy on the relationship between specialization auditors with audit quality is ambiguous. Deviant applied strategy may adversely affect the client if the strategy is not to reduce the gap of knowledge possessed by the auditor specialization. This is because the auditor's specialty can only accumulate knowledge and experience for companies that perform normal industry strategies. This leads to both auditors' specialists and non-specialists do not have specific knowledge related to extreme industrial strategy [38] . Hence, we propose the hypothesis in the alternative format as follows:
H2a (the reduced knowledge gap hypothesis): A positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be weakened by the deviant strategy that was applied to the client On the other hand, deviant strategy can be a positive influence, with the following reasons. First, since auditor specializations audit clients from the same industry, when faced with clients with extreme strategies, auditor specializations will gain more understanding than non-specialist auditors. Second, the existing literature finds that auditor specializations can better assess business or risk-related strategies than nonspecialist auditors [32] . Thirdly, Low (2004) found that auditor specializations would be better at understanding the risk of high-risk audit contracts than non-specialist auditors. Clients with deviant strategies tend to experience extreme performance [34] , so in analyzing corporate risk with deviant strategies, auditor specializations will work better than non-specialist auditors.
The fourth reason, when a client has a strategy to the extreme, non-specialist auditors will have difficulty in finding or using benchmark industry (industry benchmark)
in assessing the appropriateness of accounting policies and procedures applied to the client. Unlike non-specialist auditors, the auditor specialization will easily understand the client's strategy because it can search for industry references based on prior audit experience. And the fifth reason, clients with deviant strategies also tend to be exposed to information asymmetry problems because outsiders find it difficult to understand the business strategy and business model. From these reasons, the deviant strategy that was applied to the client will be relatively enlarge the gap of knowledge and specialization of auditors and non-specialists.
Yuan, Cheng and Ye (2016) have examined the relationship between client's business strategy and audit quality from auditor specializations. By using a public company DOI 10 .18502/kss.v3i11.2757 Page 152
The 2nd ICVHE listed in China during the period 2000 to 2010, the study found that the auditors at the level of partner specialization significantly negatively related to the profit improvement management (upward earnings management) that do client (earnings management is proxied by discretionary accruals). And specialist industry influence is greater when the client's business strategy deviates from the normal strategy of the industry, this is consistent with the enlarged knowledge gap hypothesis. So we propose the hypothesis in the alternative format as follows:
H2b (the enlarged knowledge gap hypothesis): A positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be reinforced by a deviant strategy that is applied to the client.
In order to correctly identify a company's entry into which strategy category, a study should conduct a personal interview and survey to the company's management. But H3b (the reduced knowledge gap hypothesis): A positive relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality will be weakened by the client's defender strategy.
Research Methodology
Research framework
The research model underlying this research can be seen in Figure III 
Empirical model and research variables
The purpose of the empirical model to be elaborated below is to test the research 
Variable measurement 3.3.1. Dependent variables
Qualified auditors have the competence to be able to detect financial statement errors and do not hesitate to report these errors because they have high independence.
Therefore, the company (client) will tend to avoid the action of earnings management.
This indicates that the audit quality will decrease the company's tendency in earnings management. Many studies have found that high levels of discretionary accruals indicate a profit manipulation. Therefore, the level of discretionary accruals is related to audit quality [3] . Audit quality measurements using discretionary accruals have been 
Independent variable
Auditor specialization Chi and Chin (2011) suggested that the effect of specialization auditor to audit quality, it can be seen from a public accounting firm ('KAP') and partner level. From the data analysis, it appears that during the observation period, the five highest category of audit firm in industrial agriculture has a market share which ranged between 4.62% and 18.45%. And in level partner, the five highest partner category in industrial agriculture has a market share which ranged between 2.41% and 6.91%.
And for industrial mining, the five highest audit firm has a market share which ranged between 4.56% and 24.25%. And the five highest partner has a market share which ranged between 3.17% and 10.43%. Therefore, this study takes the discretion to take the 10% threshold for categorizing level of specialization auditor firm (FIS) and the 5% threshold for categorizing the level of partner specialization auditor (PIS). To construct the measurement of deviant strategy, we will standardize each indicator strategy for all companies in the industry and the same year (each value indicators of the strategy will be reduced with the industry -year mean value, and then divided by the value of industry -year standard deviation for each group indicator strategy) and then calculate the absolute value of the score which has been standardized. The final value of the composite deviant strategy will be calculated by averaging the value of all the six indicators of the strategy.
As for the type of measurement construct clients' business strategy (STRAT), whether the kind of prospector or defender (typology of Miles et al. (1978) ). This study follows the measurements were made by Bentley et al. (2013) . First will be measured metrics strategies include: (1) the ratio of R&D costs to sales, (2) the ratio of workers to sales, (3) the sales growth (percentage change in the total sales in year t to the year t-1), (4) the ratio marketing costs to sales, (5) fluctuations workers (standard deviation of total workers), and (6) capital intensity (PPE net divided by total assets).
Each company will calculate the average value of the whole year of observations for each indicator.
Subsequently, we will create an order (ranking) the average value of each indicator for a company of samples. Ranking will be divided by five (quantile), where the highest quantile first will get a score of 5, the second highest quantile would receive a score of 4, and so on so that the lowest quantile would receive a score of 1. 
Control variables
To ensure that the quality is affected by the auditor industry specialization and moderated by client strategy, then we insert some other variables that have been tested affect audit quality. Client size (SIZE) are included in the model because previous research has found that the bigger the client will improve the quality of the audit [38] .
SIZE is measured by the value of the natural logarithm of the total assets of the client.
Leverage (LEV) is measured by the ratio of the value of total liabilities divided by total assets. Company with a high leverage has high incentive to increase the value of earnings (earnings management) in order to avoid breaching debt covenants [37] .
Return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by the value of the total assets value.
Value of discretionary accrual generally positively related to accounting performance [6, 18] . Therefore, this research is enter ROA to control the effects of the company's performance. While the company's age (AGE), is a measure of how long a client company has been listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Age of companies included in the model in order to control the effects of the company's life cycle over the discretionary accruals. And lastly, to control the size of the auditors, we included dummy variables BIG (rated 1 if audited by the Big-4 accounting firm, and 0 otherwise). Because previous studies have proposed the greater the auditing firm the better the quality of audits produced [7] .
Sample and data
The population used in this study includes companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Analysis of Results
Overview of research samples
The sample in this research are companies listed on the Stock Exchange, which is , and the necessary data is not complete (3 companies). Hence, the total sample of companies used in this study amounted to 50 companies (see Table 1 ).
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Analysis descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistical analysis aims to provide a simple description of the data and the results of research conducted (Court, 2001). Table 2 shows that the average value of discretionary accruals is -12.4% of the total assets of the company the previous year. The average value FISLEAD showed an average 24% of the sample audited by the accounting firm that has clients the highest in the industry. The average value The 2nd ICVHE
Test results hypothesis
The regression results of empirical models can be seen in is explained by other variables that are not addressed in this study.
Testing hypothesis 1 (H1)
As shown in Table 3 . The regression results show that four independent variables that measure the auditor specialization, namely FISLEAD, FISDOM, PISLEAD, and PISDOM, only variables FISLEAD which has a value significantly affect audit quality, the value of -2.391 (α = 1%). This indicates that the auditor specialization in KAP level significantly negative effect on audit quality. Thus, the alleged hypothesis 1 (H1) in the alternative form stating that the auditor specialization positive effect on audit quality is not able to be accepted (rejected).
Testing hypothesis 2 (H2a and H2b)
Variable business strategy client show how far the business strategy of the client differ/deviate strategy clients' business in general (deviant strategy -DS) indicates that either directly, or in the interaction with the variable specialization auditor, variable DS indicates a value significantly affect audit quality. This can be seen from Table 3 which shows that the DS has a value of coefficient of -0.441 (α = 10%), DSFISLEAD has a coefficient -1.847 (α = 1%), DSFISDOM has a 2.441 coefficient value (α = 1%), DSPISLEAD value coefficient of -1.018 (α = 1%), and DSPISDOM has a 1.512 coefficient value (α = 1%).
Results of regression interaction between a client's business strategy with specialization auditor showed ambiguous results. If the auditor specialization is measured using a number of auditors have a market-share the highest (LEAD), then the client's business strategy affect the relationship between specialization auditors with audit quality negatively and significantly (weaken). Meanwhile, if the specialization audit measured using a number of auditors have a market-share with a value of minimum 10% (to the level of KAP -FISDOM) and the minimum value of 5% (to the level of partner -PISDOM), then the business strategy of the client affects the relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality positive and significant (strengthen).
However, because the current testing variables multicollinearities PISDOM identified have multicollinearity problems, the analysis of the results of the hypothesis is only seen from a variable interaction FISLEAD and PISLEAD, namely client business strategies affect the relationship between specialization auditors with audit quality is negatively significant (weaken).
In accordance with the results of the first hypothesis, it can be declared negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be weakened by the deviant strategy that is applied to the client (supports the reduced knowledge gap hypothesis). However, when referring to the hypothesis 2a which states that the positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be reinforced by a deviant strategy that is applied to the client, and hypothesis 2b which states that the positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be reinforced by a deviant strategy that is applied to the client, then this result is not able to accept hypothesis 2a and 2b (the hypothesis is rejected).
Testing hypothesis 3 (H3a and H3b)
Multicollinearities In accordance with the results of the first hypothesis, when the auditor specialization is measured by the number of clients the most, it can be declared negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality would be enhanced by strategies prospector applied to clients (supporting the enlarged knowledge gap hypothesis).
Meanwhile, when the auditor specialization is measured based on the ownership of market share with a minimum threshold of 10%, it can be declared negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit the quality of the strategy will be weakened by
the defender who applied the client (supports the reduced knowledge gap hypothesis).
However, when referring to the hypothesis 3a which states that the positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality would be enhanced by strategies prospector applied to the client, and the hypothesis 3b which states that the positive relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality would be mitigated by a strategy defender applied to the client, then this result is not able to accept hypothesis 3a and 3b (the hypothesis is rejected).
Discussion of results
Analysis of the relationship between specialization Auditor and the Audit Quality
The estimated regression coefficient value FISLEAD which is negative and significant, indicating that this study provides evidence for a negative influence of specialization auditors on audit quality. This contrasts with the results of many previous studies [6, 13, 21, 29, 32] which found no evidence that specialization auditor positive effect on audit quality.
But if refer to the related research specialization auditor has been done before in Indonesia, such as Herusetya (2009) were not able to provide evidence of the difference in the quality of earnings for companies audited by the specialization of auditors as well as by non-specialists, and also there is no difference between companies audited by the Big4 and non-Big4. As well as research conducted by Setiawan and Fitriany (2011) who found that the workload faced by auditors can degrade the quality of the audit. Then the argument might explain why the results of this study provide the results of a negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality, is due to specialization auditor (as measured by client ownership highest) have a manager or staff auditor who bear the workload greater than it should be. This can degrade the quality of expertise (competence) which has, so in the end the quality of audits decreased.
Analysis of the relationship between business strategy with Specialization Auditor and Audit Quality
This study measures the client's business strategy applied by the two constructs, the strategy of aberrant (deviant strategy -DS) and the strategy typology Miles et al.
(1978), namely the defender, analyzer and prospector (STRAT). Results of regression testing showed the value of the DS, DSFISLEAD and DSPISLEAD negatively and significantly. Referring to the results of testing the first hypothesis, it can be declared negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality will be weakened by the deviant strategy that is applied to the client.
With the argument that the alleged negative relationship between specialization auditor to audit quality occurs because the workload of specialization auditor is excessive, then the client which currently implementing deviant strategy would reduce the difference in the auditor's information specialist with the non-specialist. This is because the non-specialist auditors do not have sufficient knowledge and experience on a particular industry, and on the other hand auditor specialization, because workload of work is excessive, are not able to use the knowledge and experience to good that measurement is the same as another independent variable measurement were tested in this study. When viewed from the sample data, it appears that the majority of companies in the sample into the category of the analyzer are 45 companies (90%).
The rest fall into the category prospector consists of 4 companies (8%), and defender amounted to one company (2%). This suggests a homogeneity in the type of business strategy applied by the company sample. Because of this homogeneity problem, the influence of client strategy (as measured by the typology of Miles (1978)) on the relationship between specialization auditors with audit quality is not analyzed further.
Conclusion and Limitations of Research
Conclusions research
This study aims to determine the role of the client's business strategy moderating Differences of this study with previous research is in addition to measuring the client's business strategy to construct deviant strategy as practiced by Yuan, Cheng, and Ye (2016), this study also used the construct of business strategy in accordance with the strategy typology Miles et al. (1978) .Auditor of data used in this study also uses data directly from P2PK, so that the number of clients for each public accounting firms and partners (market share) reflect the real situation, not only public companies only.
The model proposed in this study has a value of Prob. (F-statistic) were significant at 0.0000, this suggests that the independent variables were tested together significant (α = 1%) influencing variables bound (DA). However, this study has not been able to provide proof of the whole hypothesis.
The study found that auditor specialization negatively affects audit quality, and client's business strategy negatively affects (weakens) a negative relationship between auditor specialization and auditor quality. Referring to the research of Setiawan and Fitriany (2011) who found that the workload encountered by the auditor could degrade the quality of the audit, the authors suspect a negative relationship between the auditor's specialty and audit quality because the auditor's special audit team members' (as measured by the highest client ownership) workload that is larger than it should be. This can degrade the quality of skills (competence) it has, so in the end the quality of the audit decreases.
In relation to the deviant strategy employed by clients, this study finds that client's client business strategy weakens the negative relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality. This is supposed to happen because while auditor specialization has more knowledge and experience than non-specialists, but the number of job workloads makes auditor specializations incapable of using their knowledge and The 2nd ICVHE Business strategy testing using Miles typology (1978) is not analyzed further because there is a problem of multicollinearity and homogeneity in the sample company.
Research implications
The results of this study empirically provide evidence that the auditor's specialization (as measured by the highest client ownership) has a negative effect on audit quality, and the client's business strategy negatively affects the negative relationship between auditor specialization and auditor quality. This is supposed to happen because members of the auditor's specialization team bear more workload than they should. To maintain the quality of the audit, both KAP and regulators should set or set the optimal workload for each member of the audit team. Because if over-workload conditions continue to occur, then the quality of the audit will continue to decline, and ultimately the credibility of the audit profession can be questioned.
Limitations of research
There are several limitations encountered in this study. Third, the number of years of observation in this study only three years, and only use two types of industries. So, the test results cannot be generalized.
Suggestions for further research
With the various limitations contained in this study, it can be recommended some of the following. First, discretionary accruals and auditor specializations should be measured in various sizes and models. So that the test results can be more accurate and robust.
